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Abstract 
  
 This article examines the course of tobacco litigation in the United States and 
its implications for law and policy in the future, both in the U.S. and internationally. 
In our view, the different legal traditions and attitudes of other countries when applied 
to the current balance achieved in the U.S. through a mix of litigation, settlement, and 
regulation will lead the majority of such states to opt for the direct and transparent 
regulation of tobacco activities through formal and perhaps consensual channels, 
thereby bypassing the long and costly stage of litigation that characterized the U.S. 
process. Therefore, despite some increased litigation in the product liability area as a 
whole, the approach to tobacco control on the international level is likely to be 
characterized by the continuing, and, indeed, increased reliance on direct regulation 
rather than on ad hoc litigation, the efficiencies of the former approach having now 
become evident. 
 
 
JEL codes: L59 (regulation – other) K33(international law) I18 (public health policy) 
Keywords: Tobacco litigation, tobacco regulation. 
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People are not disturbed by 
things, but by the view they take 
of them.  
Epictetus, in Manual V. 
I. Introduction 
 Tobacco litigation as it has developed in the United States and increasingly 
abroad constitutes an “iconic” example of private, and in some cases state-supported, 
litigants using the courts as an ad hoc policy-making vehicle for mediating between 
the interests of an existing but controversial industry and evolving societal views and 
priorities. Such litigation has evolved over time in terms of its scope, magnitude, and 
sophistication. The intent of this article is to review the history and evolution of this 
litigation and to assess the extent to which it has served the broader public interest 
(defined as achieving public health objectives in a decentralized, but efficient 
manner).1 We also assess whether the U.S. experience can serve as a guidepost for 
future approaches to law and policy on the international level.  
The first tobacco case in the United States was filed in 1954, with 
international developments following some thirty years later. The first case brought 
outside of the United States was filed in Australia in 1986, while Europe followed in 
1988 with a case in Finland. Asia became active in the 1990’s, with cases in Japan, 
Korea, and the Philippines. More recently, China has seen an initial case filed against 
the State Tobacco Monopoly in 2005. Latin America, particularly Brazil, has also 
witnessed the development of substantial tobacco litigation in recent years, further 
illustrating the gradual ripple effect of the U.S. litigation experience internationally. 
Therefore, tobacco litigation no longer can be seen as a strictly U.S. phenomenon. 
                                                
1 Stephen D. Sugarman, The Smoking War and the Role of Tort Law (Apr. 3 1998 draft), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/sugarmans/jgfsm.htm (evaluating the role of tort law and 
inquiring as to whether tobacco deserves different treatment than other product sectors, such as alcohol, 
automobiles, and medicines). 
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The initial U.S. case involved an individual smoker whose wife filed a 
wrongful death action alleging that her husband’s illness was caused by smoking, a 
behavior resulting from the conduct, or rather misconduct, of the industry with regard 
to the design, manufacture, and marketing of the product.2 Over time, plaintiffs 
developed a number of standard allegations, including a failure of tobacco companies 
to warn of the dangers of smoking as they relate to its health effects or addictive 
properties, and allegations concerning a defective product. Other claims which have 
gained increasing currency in recent years are fraud and misrepresentation. Much has 
been made of the strategy of the tobacco companies to contest these cases using all of 
the resources at their disposal, despite the fact that cigarettes remain a legal and 
highly regulated product.  
The tobacco companies have been singularly successful in defending the vast 
majority of these cases not only due to their use, some would say, “abuse,” of the 
procedural playing field,3 but also because judges and juries have looked at the merits 
of these cases and have found the notion of “consumer awareness” of the risks of 
smoking to be a compelling defense against liability on the part of the industry. 
 Awareness issues can relate to both the specific awareness of the plaintiff in 
the case or to the general awareness or “common knowledge” of the members of the 
                                                
2 Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds, 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956) (where the plaintiff sought compensation for 
suffering, pain, and death of her husband, who died of lung cancer after allegedly relying upon 
representations in certain newspaper advertisements and television and radio broadcasts to the effect 
that “20,000 doctors say that ‘Camel’ cigarettes are healthful” and that such cigarettes “are harmless to 
the respiratory system”). 
3 This tactic was put into stark relief by Michael Jordan, an attorney who successfully defended R.J. 
Reynolds (RJR) in the 1980s. He described the dynamics as follows: “The aggressive posture we have 
taken regarding depositions and discovery in general continues to make these cases extremely 
burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs’ lawyers. . . To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won 
these cases was not by spending all of [RJR’s] money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend all 
his.” Richard Daynard & Graham Kelder, Tobacco Litigation as a Public Health and Cancer Control 
Strategy, 51 J. AM. MED. WOMEN’S ASS’N, 57, 58 (1996).  
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ambient social context.4 Both types of awareness evidence can be brought to bear 
with varying degrees of vigor, depending on the nature of the allegations or the 
proposed defense.  
Judges and juries have found credence in the “common knowledge” defense, 
meaning that as a member of the given community or society, the plaintiff knew or 
should have known of the risks of smoking. Both groups can relate personally to this 
line of argument, given their own membership in the community. In addition, the 
“common sense” awareness defense serves as an accessible counterpoint to the more 
technical aspects of the medical defense. The persuasive force of this evidence seems 
to lie in the general perception that consumers have enough information to assess 
accurately the costs and benefits of tobacco consumption.  
Despite a history of success in defending these cases, the industry reached a 
substantial settlement in 1998 with the state governments in the United States 
concerning the alleged misconduct of the companies and the medical treatment costs 
associated with smoking-attributable diseases.5 These cases and the related settlement, 
both of which are described in greater detail below, constituted a melding of law and 
policy that should be factored into tobacco control policies on the international level. 
It is fair to ask why the industry found it necessary or advisable to seek an 
accommodation when its defense posture, winning record in the cases, and overall 
legal position were indicative of a manageable risk. The answer to this question lies in 
the impact of certain aspects of the U.S. legal system on the amounts at issue, the 
                                                
4 In Continental Europe, the duty of diligence is commonly interpreted in a general, objective manner 
rather than a specific, subjective manner. Conduct is compared to that of the reasonable person placed 
in similar circumstances and corrected with a moral/deontological note comprised of the bonus pater 
familias formula. 
5 The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was signed on November 23, 1998 between 46 states and 
the four largest tobacco companies. In 2004, certain states (e.g., Ohio, Maine, and Massachusetts) sued 
the tobacco industry for money owed under the terms of the Agreement. The dispute arose from a 
provision allowing the reduction of industry payments for business lost.  
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nature of the claims, and the ability to bring these elements together in the form of 
new liability theories backed by parties with significant political power and resources. 
Against a backdrop of declining social acceptance of smoking and new studies 
relating to nicotine and its propensity to cause “dependence,” these developments 
influenced the industry to act decisively to curb further litigation. 
To summarize, our discussion will initially focus on the historical evolution of 
tobacco litigation in the United States (Section II) as divided into several distinct 
chronological phases or “waves.”  Section III reviews the implications and impact of 
evolving tobacco litigation on regulation. Then, in Section IV, the international 
diffusion of tobacco litigation is presented. A discussion of the likely evolution of 
tobacco litigation and its implications for regulation in countries other than the United 
States is set forth in Section V. Finally, Section VI provides the concluding remarks. 
II.  History of the U.S. Experience 
A. Early Litigation - Core Structure of an Individual Case -1950s/60s 
A typical tobacco case, dating back to the first cases in the 1950s, alleges that 
an individual began smoking at a young age ignorant of the attendant health risks and 
that subsequently such individual was unable to quit due to the addictive properties of 
the product. These allegations were further buttressed in the late 1980s and early 
1990s by the findings of the U.S. Surgeon General and the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, describing nicotine as an addictive drug.6 Such allegations are often 
reinforced by claims of fraud and misrepresentation regarding the conduct of the 
                                                
6 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING - OICOTINE 
ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/ 
sgr/sgr_1988/index.htm; Letter from David Kessler, Commissioner, FDA, to the Coalition on Smoking 
or Health (1995) (stating that the FDA had received “mounting evidence” that “the nicotine ingredient 
in cigarettes is a powerfully addictive agent” and that “cigarette vendors control the levels of nicotine 
to satisfy this addiction) in Daynard & Kelder, supra note 3, at 58; accord. Heikki T. Hiilamo, Tobacco 
Control Implications of the First European Product Liability Suit, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 22 (2005); 
cf. Jacques Le Houezec, Albert Hirsch & Yves Martinet, Time for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulatory 
Authority for France, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 343 (2006) (reflecting new trend in recent papers 
emphasizing nicotine, its properties, and the need for regulation).  
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companies and the alleged information asymmetries existing between the consumers 
and the industry. The prevailing information environment, including what consumers 
knew or could have known has, however, often served to blunt these claims, thereby 
yielding a powerful common sense “awareness” defense that vitiates such 
allegations.7 
 As one would expect, tobacco litigation often involves a number of medical 
submissions on both sides, with plaintiffs seeking to meet their burden of proof 
regarding causation. Plaintiffs must show that despite their knowledge of the health 
risks, the smoking of cigarettes, due to their inherent (defective) design or the actions 
of the companies in the marketing of the products, 8 was the proximate cause of the 
alleged damage, whether in the form of the illness or addiction, which in recent years 
has been claimed as an injury. The complexity or “multi-factorial” nature of the 
diseases at issue often makes the establishment of medical causation difficult for 
plaintiffs, leading in many cases to a so-called battle of the experts. Regardless of the 
liability theory, whether founded on negligence (or negligent failure to warn), 
fraudulent misrepresentation, or strict liability regarding the design of the product, the 
individual plaintiffs have generally been unable to meet their burden of proof 
regarding causation, injury, and damage.9 
                                                
7 The milestone Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 
(1965),  mandated that each packet bear the warning, “Caution: Cigarette smoking may be hazardous to 
your health.” Such legal innovation proved to be an important defense for the industry, leading to a 
doctrine of “preemption” with regard to certain claims based on a failure to warn. See Cippollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The Cigarette Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 
(1970),  later removed all tobacco advertising from radio and television. 
8 Sugarman, supra note 1 (giving the opinion that the tort liability threat distorted the industry’s 
incentives to develop safer cigarettes, as improvements could buttress claims relating to the defective 
design of earlier cigarettes and their failure to be “state-of-the-art”); see Stephen D. Sugarman, & 
Agnes Rody Robb, Suing the Tobacco Companies in the U.S. and Japan (Nihon University, 1998) 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/sugarmans/NIHON.htm (highlighting the role of the 
consumer, mentioning that novel designs, such as the “Premier” cigarette, may have been “safer,” but 
were essentially rejected by consumers for a number of subjective reasons, including taste). 
9 See Sugarman & Robb, supra note 8 (on causation and for a review of possible bases of liability for 
the tobacco industry).  
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The combination of the “awareness” defense (i.e., that the plaintiff knew or 
should have known of the risks), coupled with the difficulties in proving medical 
causation have resulted in the companies winning the vast majority of these cases. 
Even with regard to claims based on intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation, 
awareness evidence can be used to demonstrate that the plaintiff did not or could not 
reasonably have relied on the alleged misrepresentations, knowing them to be false as 
a matter of “common knowledge.” Similarly, claims based on negligent failure to 
warn or design defect have failed due to the companies’ ability to demonstrate that the 
alleged dangers were known. 
B. The Second Wave - Role of Document Production - 1988 to 199410 
After the first wave of litigation in the 1950’s and a brief spike in cases in the 
mid-1960s following the publication of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report,11 tobacco 
litigation abated until 1988 when the Cipollone case was filed, effectively starting a 
second wave of litigation which exhibited distinct characteristics.12   
Plaintiffs attempted to prove the historical core allegations through increased 
reliance on industry documents produced as a result of discovery,13 a U.S. procedural 
                                                
10 Marlo Miura, Richard A. Daynard & Jonathan M. Samet, The Role of Litigation in Tobacco Control, 
48 SALUD PÚBLICA DE MÉXICO 121, 121 (2006), available at 
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0036-36342006000700015&lng=pt. (the 
forced release of the industry’s internal documents constituted “one of the most powerful consequences 
of the recent litigation”);  Richard A. Daynard, Tobacco Litigation: A Mid Course Review, 12 CANCER 
CAUSES & CONTROL 383 (2001). 
11 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964), available at 
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/M/Q/; see ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, SMOKING AND 
HEALTH (1962) (reflecting concerns similar to those set forth in the U.S. Surgeon General's Report of 
1964); ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS & ACTION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, FORTY FATAL YEARS: 
A REVIEW OF THE 40 YEARS SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF THE 1962 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF 
PHYSICIANS ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (2002), available at http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/pubs/books/ 
ash/fortyfatalyears.pdf. 
12 Cipollone, supra note 7 (involving a products liability suit against tobacco companies where for the 
first time, the jury was allowed to view tobacco companies internal documents allegedly outlining a 
strategy to mislead the public about the dangers of smoking). 
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 to 37; Miura, Daynard, & Samet, supra note 10, at 126 (resulting to plaintiffs’ 
a ttorneys and the health movements organizing and pooling resources as more cases were 
filed). 
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device whereby litigants are able to ask for documents from the other side in order to 
narrow and focus the issues. Indeed, document production has taken on epic 
proportions in the United States.14 Some 30 million separate items were produced in 
the Minnesota attorney general litigation alone,  a case in which the State of 
Minnesota sought to recover the amounts expended to treat “smoking-attributable” 
illnesses among the treatment populations of certain state-supported health plans.15  
C. The Third Wave - Class Actions – 1990s 
For the next wave of litigations, a new approach began to take shape using the 
procedural device of the class action.16 This procedural innovation was accompanied 
by the development of “new” substantive claims, including those relating to non-
smokers exposed to second-hand smoke (or Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS)), 
and smokers injured in fires caused by cigarettes, both of which tended to eliminate or 
deemphasize the role of the plaintiff’s awareness and volition in causing the alleged 
damage.  
The use of class actions constituted an attempt to garner increased economic 
leverage by aggregating claims among individual smokers based on the assumption 
that there were common issues, typical to the class that predominated throughout, and 
that adjudication as a class would therefore further the public policy aims of judicial 
economy and efficiency. The class action was an attempt to level the playing field 
between the industry and the plaintiffs, though the scope for misusing this procedural 
                                                
14 Miura, Daynard, & Samet, supra note 10, at 130 (with the Minnesota settlement securing from the 
industry a “roadmap” to its internal documents and a ten-year paid depository for the documents in 
Minnesota and Great Britain).  
15 Id., at 122-124 (on the use of scientific evidence in tobacco litigation);  THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 
(Stanton A. Glantz, et al, eds., 1996) (creating a massive disclosure attitude of “secret” documents 
everywhere). 
16 Typical are Engle v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-22 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 
2000) rev'd, 853 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 
(5th Cir. 1996) (both decertified), and Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So.2d 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) 
(involving an Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) case with companies settling to pay $300 million 
to a scientific research foundation to support federal legislation prohibiting smoking in international 
flights, among other concessions). 
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device to seek class status for frivolous or unsuitable claims has been great, leading 
most recently in the United States to the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act in 
2005.17   
No longer was this a debate between a lone smoker and a powerful industry, 
but a clash between two powerful adversaries, the industry and a group of aggrieved 
smokers whose claims in the aggregate could reach billions of dollars, including 
punitive damages awards authorized by the U.S. legal system. Beyond the litigants, 
the class action mechanism also attracted the attention of another powerful group, the 
plaintiffs’ bar. The growing social unacceptability of smoking,18 coupled with the 
high awards at issue, rendered the industry an attractive target and caused plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to redouble their efforts to develop new and ever more sophisticated claims to 
bring a reputedly wayward industry to heel. In addition, the contingency fees detailed 
below provided a powerful economic incentive for the plaintiffs’ lawyers to take and 
promote these cases.  
Certain aspects of the U.S. legal system fueled the proliferation of tobacco 
litigation during the 1990s. Among these were the damages awards at issue,19 
stemming from procedural devices, such as class actions for aggregating claims, the 
                                                
17 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). Class actions face some natural difficulties in the tobacco area: i) the individual 
nature of the liability questions remains; ii) the cases become too large to handle; and iii) questions 
arise as to whether the lawyers or their clients actually benefit. Richard O. Faulk, Armageddon through 
Aggregation? The Use and Abuse of Class Actions in International Dispute Resolution, 10 MICH. ST. 
DETROIT C. L. J. INT’L L. 205 (2001) available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=richard_faulk (discussing the merits and problems of class 
actions); RICHARD A. POSNER,  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003). 
18 The social pressure against tobacco benefited from several attempts from the FDA to regulate 
nicotine as a drug. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 US 120 (2000) (holding that 
the FDA had no authority to regulate tobacco). Individual plaintiffs also turned their attention to the 
addictive nature of cigarettes by alleging that while they “chose” to smoke, they were not free to stop. 
The 29 Surgeon General’s Reports on Smoking and Health published between 1964-2006 were also 
instrumental in sustaining this momentum.  
19 Matthias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: 
Emergence of a Worldwide Standard? 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751 (2003) (for a comparison with the rest 
of the world regarding product liability awards). 
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sanctioning by the U.S. legal system of punitive damages,20 which could be highly 
disproportionate to the compensatory amounts at issue,21 and the practice in the U.S. 
system of taking cases on a contingent fee basis (i.e., no foal, no fee), a practice 
highly restricted by most continental legal systems.22  
The confluence of a “socially” unacceptable industry, the prospects of 
substantial damages awards, and an active plaintiffs’ bar underwritten by contingent 
fee arrangements spawned a type of legal “free-for-all” caricatured both at home and 
abroad in numerous television programs and movies. To paraphrase John Grisham, 
the reality was if not a “runaway jury,” a runaway legal system. Parties disagree as to 
whether this heightened activity has promoted the interests of tobacco control, 
improved the lives of those bringing the cases, and contributed to a constructive 
modus vivendi, or whether it has merely enriched lawyers on both sides and created a 
type of Mexican “stand-off” resulting in a misallocation of both intellectual and 
financial resources.23 The more limited scope and volume of tobacco litigation in 
jurisdictions outside of the United States suggest that the favorable procedural context 
and related financial incentives were a major factor in the proliferation of these cases 
in the United States as opposed to elsewhere. Moreover, the overall societal welfare 
                                                
20 In Continental Europe, modern theories of liability generally assume a compensatory function not a 
punitive one. This is a point stressed and criticized by the Law and Economics school. DAVID D. 
FRIEDMAN,  LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 206-211 
(2000).  STEVEN SHAVELL,  FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004) ) (on the economic 
rationale for punitive damages). 
21 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. SCHKADE, & W. KIP VISCUSI,  
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002) (on a general view of the debate about surrounding 
such damages). Thomas A. Eaton, David B. Mustard & Susette M. Talarico, The Effects of Seeking 
Punitive Damages on the Processing Tort Claims, 34 J. LEGAL STUDIES 343, 343-344 (2005) (“Critics 
maintain that punitive damage awards are highly unpredictable, with large variations in size, and that 
juries are ill informed and poorly equipped to perform rational risk assessment.”). 
22 Reimann, supra note 19, 823 n.385. 
23 Daynard & Kelder, supra note 3; Miura, Daynard & Samet, supra note 10 (both reviewing the 50-
year history of U.S. tobacco litigation from a public health, advocacy perspective, portraying litigation 
as a valid and important strategy for tobacco control and expressing enthusiasm about the efficacy and 
prospects of success for the “third wave” of litigation). 
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outcome achieved in the United States in terms of resources expended and efficiencies 
gained remains questionable. 
D. The Third Wave Continues - Medical Cost Recoupment Litigation – 1994 and 
Beyond 
In developing new and more sophisticated claims, the plaintiffs’ bar sought to 
leverage the mechanisms for aggregating claims and to blunt the effect of 
“awareness” evidence, which convinced both judges and juries that individuals were 
responsible for their own situations when duly aware of the risks of a given behavior. 
The class action mechanism had achieved the aggregation of damages amounts, but 
still left plaintiffs vulnerable to arguments that smoking behavior and disease were 
largely individualized inquiries. As a result, the federal courts in the U.S. have not 
certified the majority of class actions. Instead they continue to be viewed as 
individualized claims that fail to meet the criteria of commonality, typicality, and 
predominance regarding the issues at hand, and as a result fail to further the broader 
goals of judicial economy and efficiency. 
Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, class certification 
depends on the satisfaction of the criteria of numerosity, typicality, and commonality. 
The named plaintiffs must also demonstrate that they can adequately represent the 
class. For mass tort actions claiming monetary damages, plaintiffs must further 
demonstrate that the common issues “predominate” and that the class action 
mechanism is superior to other forms of dispute resolution in terms of efficiency and 
judicial economy.24 The extent to which these last two criteria are fulfilled falls within 
the purview of judicial discretion; the individualized nature of smoking behavior, 
                                                
24 “(b)An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, 
and, in addition:… (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the 
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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lifestyles, and disease, have, in the view of most federal courts, rendered these cases 
unsuitable for certification.25   
The state courts have been somewhat more accommodating in certifying these 
cases, with the Engle case in Florida being the most notable example. 26 However, 
even a certified class becomes subject at a later stage to a series of mini-trials, where 
questions concerning the nature of each claimant’s disease, behavior, individual level 
of awareness, and resulting responsibility are examined. Accordingly, while the class 
action mechanism afforded a degree of leverage by creating blocks of claimants and 
high damages amounts, it failed to obviate the persuasive defenses developed to 
dissect the nature of an individual’s claim and personal responsibility in respect 
thereof.  
Given the lack of success of the above described approach, a new strategy 
emerges: asking for medical cost recoupment. Medical cost recoupment cases offered 
the prospect of high damages amounts, the active involvement of the state as a 
political support to the plaintiffs’ bar, and a potentially viable means of blunting the 
effect of the defense’s individualized evidence, whether based on awareness or 
personal medical history.  
Stated succinctly, medical cost recoupment litigation takes a treatment 
population, usually of state-supported medical program, in the aggregate and through 
statistics ascribes a portion of disease and related treatment costs to the use of 
tobacco, the so-called smoking attributable fraction.27 It is no longer the smoker who 
                                                
25 Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post 
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 1163 (1998) (suggesting the introduction of a Cigarette 
Card to make proof and trial development issues easier and to allow easier certification of such actions; 
smokers would register with the government thus making possible aggregations less complicated).  
26 Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Case No. 94-08273, Dade County, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 
Florida, filed on May 4, 1994. This was the first smokers’ class action suit filed to reach trial in U.S. 
history.  
27 Miura, Daynard, & Samet, supra note 10. 
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brings the claim, but rather a third-party payor. As such, the notion of individual 
awareness is relegated to a secondary level. The state, or in some cases the managers 
of the health plan, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, simply claim that they are being 
left with a bill, or excess costs,28 for which they are not responsible as a result of their 
own conduct. In so doing, they assert that individual awareness is not relevant to their 
claim, to the extent that their claim is separate and distinct from the individualized 
conduct of the treatment population. This makes this wave quite distinct from the first 
and second wave of litigation cases. 
Medical cost recoupment cases introduced another crucial change. The 
initiative for bringing the case is with a third party health care payor, possessing 
enhanced political power. There was an implicit assumption that the marginal costs of 
individual behavior, whether in terms of tobacco consumption, health care utilization, 
and other similar lifestyle choices could somehow be “homogenized” into a broad 
statistical model. This failure to segment individuals to evaluate their behavior as 
economic actors was inconsistent with the traditional approach to these questions 
from both an economic and litigation perspective. It did, however, provide a powerful 
means for taking the focus off both the individual and the state in terms of the 
“prophylactic” steps that could have been taken, whether through individual choices 
or prevention programs, and thereby blunted the effectiveness of the individualized 
defenses that had played a large part in company defense strategies up to that time. 
The manner in which the cases were brought and the ultimate settlement essentially 
                                                
28 Sugarman, supra note 1 (challenging the argument by advancing the idea that smokers “more than 
pay their way”); see, e.g., Robert S. Goldfarb, Thomas C. Leonard & Steven M. Suranovic, Are rival 
theories of smoking underdetermined? 8 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 229 (2001); W. Kip Viscusi, 
Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 4891, 1994) (calling attention to the states  “creative” calculation of medical costs). 
Contra Nancy Warring, Hanson and Viscusi Dispute the True Cost of Smoking, HARVARD LAW 
BULLETIN, Summer 1998, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/backissues/ 
summer98/article9.html (pointing out the intrinsic limits of cost/benefit analysis in certain issues).  
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constituted a cost shifting from health plans to the companies.29 This was a profound 
development with significant implications for the policy making process and the 
overall balance between regulation and litigation. 
Without wishing to be overly legalistic, the defense has countered that the 
claims are derivative of those of the individuals in the treatment population. As such, 
the state or medical fund must proceed in subrogation, or on a case-by-case basis, as 
an insurer and the defense should be entitled to all of the defenses it would have in 
any individual case. In such cases there is no “direct” action, to the extent that the 
damages claimed by the medical program are too remote and derivative of those of 
the individual members of the treatment population. The exclusive remedy therefore 
lay in subrogation. This line of defense was well-founded in the body of U.S. tort law 
at the time that the first cost recoupment case was brought in Mississippi in 1994. 
This case was later followed by some 49 other state cases. 30  Given the emerging 
legal doctrine, some states, including Florida,31 passed enabling legislation that 
allowed such cases to go forward by providing for a statutorily created “direct” action 
on the part of the state and denying the companies the right to raise individualized 
defenses. 
                                                
29 Daynard & Kelder, supra note 3 (arguing that third wave cases “could shift billions of dollars of 
health and productivity costs from families and third-party payers to cigarette companies, forcing 
increases in cigarette prices and consequent large drops in consumption, especially among children and 
teenagers;” though contending that this is an inefficient shift); Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law, 73 
INDIANA L. J. 867, 867-868 (1998) (claiming “one might assume that what the states are asking for is 
precisely what the progenitors of strict products liability envisioned: enterprise liability for the 
manufacturers of an inherently dangerous product,” in reality, this shift to the companies means no 
more than obliging them to “fully” internalize the social costs of tobacco sale). Contra Sugarman & 
Robb, supra note 8.     
30 Mississippi was the first state to sue tobacco companies in 1994. The case was settled in 1997 and 
one year later three other settlements were reached with Florida, Texas, and Minnesota, generating a 
payment from the industry of $35.3 billion for a period of 25 years, among many other obligations. 
These individual state settlements were followed by the MSA, covering the outstanding recoupment 
claims of the remaining 46 states. 
31 See Florida’s Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. § 409.910 (Supp. 1994). For further 
explanation, Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, The Tobacco Deal, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS: 1998 (1998). 
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The powerful mix of social and political forces provided an almost irresistible 
momentum for the states and the industry to seek an accommodation. With huge 
damages awards at issue and the state bureaucracies mobilized against the industry, 
the downside risk of a series of cascading billion dollar judgments constituted a risk 
that the industry could not afford to take. Negotiations with members of the Clinton 
White House began with a view to seeking a global accommodation that would 
resolve the existing litigation and provide a set of ground rules and safeguards going 
forward to be ratified by an Act of Congress.32 
 The nature of the political process, together with the industry’s “sultry” 
reputation conspired, however, to torpedo these negotiations. The scope and nature of 
the historical allegations lodged against the industry caused Congress to up the 
proverbial “ante” until such time as the industry could no longer pursue the 
negotiations at that level. These discussions were eventually replaced by a direct 
dialogue with the states resulting in a more limited accord, the Master Settlement 
Agreement (“MSA”) of 1998, whereby the industry agreed to pay 206 billion dollars 
to the states over a twenty-five year period and to curb certain marketing practices in 
exchange for the dropping of all similar claims.33  
The MSA provided less sweeping protections (e.g., no formal cap on punitive 
damages in tobacco cases), but that had the virtue of being self-contained, manageable 
and conducive to immediate implementation.34 
                                                
32 THE MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND LOCAL TOBACCO CONTROL: AN ANALYSIS 
OF SELECTED TOPICS AND PROVISIONS OF THE MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF 
NOVEMBER 23, 1998 (Graham. Kelder & Patricia Davidson, eds., 1999) available at 
http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/tobacco_control/ resources/msa/msa_analysis.pdf. 
33 The MSA targeted tobacco advertising/sponsorship/merchandising and included specific provisions 
to regulate and curb youth access and restrict lobbying. It also created a National Foundation to study 
and develop programs on youth use and abuse of tobacco and to support educational programs to 
prevent diseases associated with tobacco product use. Id. (giving a more detailed analysis of the MSA).   
34 Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 31 (making a exhaustive critical review of the MSA). 
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Subsequently, medical cost recoupment cases brought by private health funds, 
as opposed to the states, have repeatedly failed on the grounds that there is no direct 
action. Denied the political lever of state support and various forms of enabling 
legislation, plaintiffs have been unsuccessful as judges have begun to reassert and 
apply traditional legal doctrine to assess and dispose of these cases. 
The MSA can be highlighted then as a consequence to a large extent of 
government power and the risks it posed to industry, rather than a result of clear cut 
legal grounds alone. Without government power on the other side, the tobacco 
industry probably would have recovered the upper hand in litigation. 
 E. Other Developments – The Federal and “Lights” Cases 
Despite the movement toward a new equilibrium between governmental 
authorities and the industry, culminating with the MSA and the dialogue it promoted, 
throwbacks to an earlier period of managing the tobacco industry through litigation 
persist. The federal government, which was not a party to the MSA, brought a 
separate case against the industry filed on September 22, 1999 in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia. This case included claims for medical cost 
recoupment, fraud and misrepresentation, and racketeering, buttressed by the 
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, known as RICO, a statute 
originally conceived to break up the criminal enterprises of organized crime.35 The 
medical cost recoupment claims of the federal government’s case have since been 
rejected, with only the RICO claims having survived.36  Subsequently, these claims 
have been “defanged” pursuant to a ruling issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia on February 4, 2005, holding that the RICO statute does not 
support claims for “disgorgement,” the government having claimed that the industry 
                                                
35 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).  
36 Miura, Daynard & Samet, supra note 10, at 130.  
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should “disgorge” its past profits in the amount of U.S. $ 290 billion. This decision 
was allowed to stand by the United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari 
review of this issue on October 17, 2005. 
On August 17, 2006, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia found with regard to the remaining allegations that the defendant 
companies had been guilty of racketeering under the terms of the RICO statute. The 
Court further ruled, however, that RICO, as written, did not support a claim for 
monetary damages or for other similar monetary remedies (e.g., compulsory financing 
by the companies of education programs), particularly in light of the previous ruling 
on “disgorgement.”  The government’s victory was therefore seen as pyrrhic, 
although public health advocates have stressed its significance:   
The importance of today's decision will be minimized by the 
racketeering defendants, but the historic finding and remedies imposed 
by the Court will 1) forever brand the cigarette companies as 
racketeers; 2) energize trial attorneys and provide a powerful set of 
documentary and testimonial evidence and findings of fact to bolster 
cigarette litigation; 3) undermine the credibility of the companies as 
they try to push into emerging markets around the world; and 4) serve 
as a powerful antidote to cigarette company attempts to portray 
themselves as responsible corporate citizens.37 
The disposition of the Federal case suggests the courts have seen fit to allow 
these issues to migrate toward the legislative arena. However, there has been a recent 
move toward formulating a new type of case involving “light” cigarettes. These cases 
allege that the development of “light” cigarettes constituted a cynical strategy on the 
                                                
37 U.S. Cigarette Companies Liable for Violating Federal Anti-Racketeering Statute: Backgrounder 
and Commentary, August 17, 2006, available at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/litigation/ 
cases/DOJ/kessler_decision_0806.htm. 
 18 
part of the industry to maintain the stock of smokers by promoting a  “safer” cigarette, 
which was in reality just as harmful, if not more so, than existing products.  
While certain individual cases involve “lights” issues, the allegations are, for 
the most part, predicated on consumer fraud. These involve claims among broad 
classes of consumers who allege that during a given number of years they purchased 
the product under false pretenses. These claims are formulated in terms of pure 
economic loss on the part of asymptomatic smokers who are claiming a refund in the 
event that the “light” cigarettes purchased did not provide a reduced level of 
harmfulness.38  
Class actions in this area are subject to the hurdles mentioned previously and 
have therefore met with uneven success in terms of certification. One notable case, 
Price v. Philip Morris et al, decided in March 2003 by a sole judge seated in Madison 
County, Illinois yielded a multibillion verdict involving both compensatory and 
punitive damages. The judgment has since been overturned by the Illinois Supreme 
Court in a judgment rendered on December 15, 2005. 39  Plaintiffs’ motion for a 
rehearing was denied in a ruling rendered by the same court on May 6, 2006  and the 
United States Supreme Court has since declined to review the case. 
The “lights” cases reveal an evolving trend in tobacco litigation toward the use 
of novel legal theories as a basis for recovery for past industry behavior. Such an 
approach is open to question as the development and marketing of these products was 
undertaken with the encouragement of the authorities and the open endorsement of 
                                                
38 These cases were propelled by recent evidence or findings presented by several institutions, such as 
the U.S. National Research Council, the International Agency for Research on Cancer of the World 
Health Organization, the U.S. National Cancer Institute, and The U.S. Surgeon General. Miura, 
Daynard, & Samet, supra note 10, at 123. Reimann, supra note 19 (Product liability does not generally 
allow actions for redressing pure economic loss, thus plaintiffs must turn to general private law.). 
39 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the Federal Trade Commission explicitly authorized the 
company to use descriptors such as “lights” and “low-tar.” As such, Philip Morris could not be held 
liable for the use of those terms under section 10b (1) of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act or under the 
Illinois Deceptive Practices Act. Price v. Philip Morris, 848 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2005). 
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the medical community. It now centers on the manner in which “light” cigarettes were 
developed and whether the industry applied best practices with regard to their design, 
manufacture, and marketing. As the authorities and the industry move toward a 
greater degree of partnership in managing the externalities associated with cigarettes, 
these cases could play a useful role in an increasingly constructive dialogue between 
government and industry about how best to manage a “product that everybody loves 
to hate.”40 Whether an evolution from litigation in court to settlement agreements will 
eventually emerge is still early to say. 
III. Economic and Regulatory Outcomes of the U.S. Experience 
A. Law and Economics 
The U.S. experience concerning recoupment litigation has set the stage for 
international tobacco litigation and offers lessons to the international arena. Medical 
cost recoupment litigation, particularly as framed by the states, marked a concerted 
attempt to transform the underlying dispute into one centered on economic damage 
(i.e., aggregate economic costs to the third party health payor rather than “specific” 
payments for individualized, personal injury). The third party payors were claiming 
what was, in their view, pure economic loss, albeit one that was “derivative” of an 
underlying personal injury (i.e., the costs associated with the diseased population). 
This approach led to a reliance on statistical aggregates rather than individualized 
proof. It often resulted in a particular reliance on epidemiological data and, to some 
extent, reflected a collapsing of public health policy issues into an adjudicative 
setting. 
 Population attributable risk calculations, which underlay many of the 
damages calculations, sought to take epidemiological data, combined with smoking 
                                                
40 Schwab v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (certifying a national class 
of "lights" smokers by alleging fraud and conspiracy under the RICO statute which suggests that the 
"lights" cases retain a certain level of political and legal vitality). 
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prevalence data, to generate a coefficient that could be applied against a “basket” of 
treatment costs to arrive at a damages amount.41 While such figures could yield a 
broad measure of an estimated cost of smoking, they could not estimate the cost of 
conduct, or, in the plaintiffs’ view, alleged misconduct of the companies.42 The latter 
was the crux of plaintiffs’ legal argument that through bad acts (i.e., misleading 
advertising, etc.) the industry had created excess smoking, which had in turn resulted 
in excess disease and associated medical costs. This conduct element was absent in 
plaintiffs’ early modeling exercises, but they later sought to address it, albeit 
unpersuasively.  
In particular, since the health plans affect the behavior of the beneficiaries in a 
potentially relevant way, the decisions to initiate, quit, or continue smoking cannot be 
traced solely to company activities.43 Comparisons to reveal the effect of company 
conduct on consumption, and by extension disease and cost, could include smoking 
rates of individuals in environments with different levels of advertising and a certain 
level of insurance as well as between individuals with and without insurance, given a 
constant level of advertising. Even this analysis, however, fails to distinguish between 
“company conduct” and “company misconduct,” another potentially relevant aspect 
of plaintiffs’ legal argumentation and related damages calculations.  
The main methodological problems with this approach lie in the identification 
of a clear control group. To trace clearly the effects of ‘misconduct,’ it is necessary to 
                                                
41 Such computations are based on regularities across the population and therefore do not take into 
account a particular individual or situation.  
42 Bulow & Klemperer, supra note  31, at 39.(“If the litigation against the companies were focused on 
truth seeking and a fair calculation of damages, then we would be less enthusiastic about legal 
protections. But none of the parties seem particularly concerned about relating payments to damages. 
That is why the up-front damage payments were based on how deep each company’s pocket was and 
not on its contribution to disease.”).  
43 Goldfarb, Robert, Leonard & Suranovic, supra note 28 (summarizing rational/non-rational smoking 
theories that reflect the complexity of calculations and models and focus on smoker behavior rather 
than company conduct); see also Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 
96 J. POL. ECON. 675 (1988). 
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identify observable decisions or consequences that arise under ‘misconduct’ but not 
under ‘proper conduct,’ the mere act of selling cigarettes as a duly authorized, legal 
activity. To the extent that smokers’ illnesses can develop under either form of 
‘conduct’ on the part of the companies, the mere onset of illness is insufficient to 
distinguish one case from the other. Plaintiffs’ usual approach implied that assessing 
the likelihood of developing an illness was a proxy for company misconduct, but it is 
unclear how to interpret the available information in order to isolate “unambiguous” 
misconduct of firms and the effect thereof from authorized commercial behavior. In 
short, plaintiffs’ aggregate damages theories masked the microeconomic analysis of 
consumer behavior and the contribution of company behavior (alleged misconduct) 
that would normally have been required to establish a colorable claim.  
With regard to the estimates themselves, plaintiffs offered numbers considered 
only as ranges to prove the precise magnitude of damage. It is here that one sees the 
potential nexus between public health policy and the adjudicative process. Estimates 
that could have been used to formulate broad tax and regulatory strategies were 
offered as measures of damage between litigants. Expert submissions from the 
defense often highlighted this point, signaling the misuse of these statistical tools and 
constructs for the designated purposes, but allowing that they could be useful in other 
contexts, such as the public policy forum. 
As the disputes with the states shifted from the courtroom to the negotiating 
arena, these broad measures of alleged damage became more appropriate benchmarks 
for discussion. They set the stage for the implementation of a new modus vivendi 
between the states and the industry, incorporating the settlement of the outstanding 
claims, while at the same time setting rules concerning marketing and future reporting 
requirements concerning consumption, particularly among juveniles. Within this 
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broader policy context, the disputes between the states and the industry had turned 
into an argument about the cost of doing business and the appropriate level of the 
associated tax. 
Today the MSA lays out the ground rules between the companies and the states 
as to future compensation and required conduct. While the implementation of this 
agreement is monitored through formal channels, one wonders whether this type of a 
negotiated accord provides the level of procedural transparency and predictability that 
a similar piece of legislation might have offered, particularly given the 25-year time 
horizon.  
B. The Interplay of Litigation and Regulation -- The Rulemaking Process44 
In the recoupment cases, litigation was essentially used to promote 
“consensual rulemaking,” albeit with a coercive element, namely the threat of multi-
billion dollar judgments supplemented by punitive damages.  In settling these cases, 
the states took a realistic view of the role of tobacco in society, recognizing its role as 
a highly flexible source of budgetary revenue and acknowledging that a substantial 
percentage of the population will choose to smoke irrespective of the marketing 
activities undertaken by the companies. The accommodation reached in the MSA 
amounted to an “atonement” by the industry for past activities viewed through a 
modern-day lens concerning appropriate standards of corporate morality and, more 
importantly, established a compact for managing a popular yet hazardous product. It 
acknowledged the economic dislocation that would be caused by “emasculating” an 
                                                
44 This interplay has been widely discussed under the title of “Regulation through Litigation” as it 
relates to risky products and products liability where regulatory standards have fallen short. The issue 
is whether litigation is needed to pursue regulation. Doug Bandow, Litigative vs. Legislative 
Democracy, March 20, 2000, available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4752 (noting 
the inefficiency of litigation, stressing that political regulatory silence remains a valid posture that 
should be respected and not necessarily interpreted as a political failure). Contra Wendy Wagner, 
When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEORGETOWN L. J. 693 
(2007) (arguing that jurors and courts are institutions that provide a necessary avenue for intervention). 
The Illinois Supreme Court ruling on Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 835 N.E.2d 801 (2005) 
was interpreted as a blow against regulation through litigation. 
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industry overnight, with the attendant implications for employment and the 
reallocation of industrial capacity. In short, the MSA constituted the melding of law 
and politics with the “art of the possible” to manage evolving economic and social 
realities.  
Assuming that the states sought to act in a benevolent manner to address a 
pressing public health problem,45 it is worth examining both their rationale and 
approach. The justification for government intervention of this type usually results 
from some form of market failure regarding the inefficient dissemination of 
information and the management of the resulting externalities (costs) to society.46 The 
typical policy response to such a situation would be to raise prices through a tax 
increase to cover the estimated cost of the externality.47  
In the present situation, the states increased the cost of the product on the 
front-end via litigation and then imposed a tax on the back-end through the 
settlement. 48 From the range of policy instruments that were at the disposal of the 
states, it would appear that they opted for the lever that was most politically and/or 
socially acceptable (i.e., suing the companies) but perhaps least efficient in terms of 
the overall cost of implementation and associated transaction costs.49 A contrary view 
holds that the political leverage of the companies in the various state legislatures 
rendered the judicial route the best and, in some respects, the only means for effecting 
                                                
45 Anti-smoking groups advocate the prohibition of tobacco sale as a solution. This approach would 
probably be effective but would raise certain problems, namely the creation of a black market and 
problems of a “paternalistic” nature.  
46 Goldfarb, Leonard, & Suranovic, supra note 28 (on the efficient dissemination of information); 
Viscusi, supra note 28 (enumerating savings arising from the shorter life expectancy of smokers). 
Contra Hanson & Logue, supra note 25; Warring, supra note 28 (identifying two main market failures: 
i) If smokers were fully informed of the smoking risks/companies’ misconduct they would change/have 
changed their decisions and ii) There is an externalization of part of the smoking social costs to the 
smokers’ insurers; which justify imposition of liability on the tobacco companies). 
47 Viscusi, supra note 28 (for a presentation of possible justifications for the use of taxes). 
48 Id.;  Sugarman, supra note 1 (this illegitimate “tax windfall” may produce a consequence --- an open 
season against all risky products). 
49 Viscusi, supra note 28.   
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far-reaching “regulatory” change in the industry.50 Accordingly, there is a nexus 
between regulation and litigation with the appropriate balance lying, to some extent, 
in the eye of the proverbial beholder. 
 In an important paper by J. Bulow and P. Klemperer entitled “The Tobacco 
Deal,” the authors contend that the crucial trade-off for the companies as set forth in 
the MSA was between liability protection and increases in cigarette taxes.51 While 
taxes were undesirable, the companies were able to use the agreement as a 
coordination device, to set prices closer to the monopoly level.  In so doing, the 
recoupment litigation, and specifically the MSA, recognized the reality of industry 
concentration and pricing power while using the same to impose a heightened control 
over industry activities, such as advertising. These were far-reaching compromises 
and trade-offs to be reached through litigation rather than regulation.52  
IV. Strategic and Analytical Considerations of the U.S. Experience for the 
International  Sphere 
As one considers the growing activism on the international level with regard 
to both tobacco control and litigation activity, 53 the following questions can be posed: 
(a) To what extent must, or should, the U.S. experience be replicated 
on the international level to bring tobacco/cigarettes,54 a product 
                                                
50 Contra Wagner, supra note 44 (claiming a political process failure with regards to risky products 
with the Courts becoming a “supplemental institutional mechanism for making products safer” rather 
than an “illegitimate end-run around the political process” as most leading scholars believe). 
51 Bulow & Klemperer, supra  note 31, at 10 (“The central trade-off was the companies accepting an 
increase in cigarette taxes in return for liability protections,”).  
52 Contra Bandow, supra note 46 (arguing against the use of litigation to establish policy); Wagner, 
supra note 44.  
53 David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Why Do Europeans Smoke More Than Americans? (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12124, 2006) (speculating that tobacco litigation may 
prove useful in raising the consciousness of the dangers of smoking, thereby yielding a social benefit 
from litigation to the extent that the dissemination of such information could not be achieved through 
consensual bargaining). See POSNER, supra note 17 (on the social benefits of litigation). 
54 The U.S. experience regarding tobacco litigation may also inform the debate concerning other public 
health issues, such as obesity and alcohol. See, e.g., The Public’s Health and the Law in the 21st 
Century, Fifth Annual Partnership Conference, June 12-14, 2006, available at            
http://www2.cdc.gov/phlp/conferencecd2006/overview. (for aims, program sessions and materials); 
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with obvious externalities but substantial natural demand, into 
conformity with current societal norms?  
(b) Does the U.S. litigation experience and the evolving social, 
economic, and commercial equilibrium arising therefrom offer a 
platform for addressing the “tobacco issue” internationally in a 
more forthright and economically efficient manner than has been 
the case in the United States? 
(c) Do evolving standards of corporate responsibility, increasing 
globalization, and the tobacco industry’s desire to project unified 
messages and to apply consistent behavioral norms offer 
opportunities for transparent regulatory action in which litigation 
would be one of many levers, but not necessarily the preferred one, 
given its inherent inefficiency?  
In examining these questions, juxtaposing the U.S. litigation experience 
against the evolving international legal environment provides insights concerning 
opportunities for managing what is universally acknowledged as a significant public 
health problem.55 This is particularly helpful given the range of economic interests of 
                                                                                                                                       
Amy N. Fairweather & James F. Mosher, Implications of Tobacco Litigation for Alcohol Policy, Paper 
delivered at the 131st Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association (November 17, 
2003) available at www.cslep.org/publications/APHA2003AlcoholLitigationpaper.pdf 
55 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to 
Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the Surgeon General (2006); World Health Organization, World Health 
Organization, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 1 (reprint 2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/tobacco/ framework/WHO_FCTC_ english.pdf (recognizing in Preamble “that the 
spread of the tobacco epidemic is a global problem with serious consequences for public health that 
calls for the widest possible international cooperation...”);  Benjamin Mason Meier, Breathing Life into 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Smoking Cessation and the Right to Health, 5 Yale J. 
Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 137 (2005). 
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seminal national importance at issue, including budgetary flexibility, employment, 
and the allocation of productive capacity.56  
Tobacco litigation has spread to diverse parts of the world, albeit with less 
scope and intensity than in the United States. The preoccupation of international 
institutions with tobacco control issues and related policies has however become a 
hallmark of the world stage. Since 1980, the European Union has enacted more than 
twenty instruments addressing the tobacco question, including directives, decisions, 
resolutions, and recommendations.  
A careful reading of such documents reveals the preoccupation of the EU with 
balancing regulatory policy concerning public health with the values and functioning 
of a free market economy. Such concerns are manifested in the key legal texts, where 
the first reference/first legal basis advanced is linked to the protection of the common 
market and the associated free flow of goods. This point is clearly set forth in 
Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001, 
wherein Article 13º provides that the consumption, sale, and importation of tobacco 
products in conformity with this Directive cannot be forbidden or restricted. 57 
Tobacco control policies and measures implemented on the international level 
have therefore sought to balance public health objectives with economic 
considerations. An examination of the interplay of law and economics in the U.S. 
litigation context, particularly in terms of the scope and evolution of the cases 
                                                
56 Gijsbert van Liemt, The world tobacco industry: Trends and Prospects 29 (ILO, Working Paper No. 
179, 2002), available at http://www.oit.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/tobacco/wp179.pdf 
(on the economic dependence of certain sectors of the population on the tobacco industry). 
57 The expansive coverage of such regulatory instruments includes the following issues: i) youth 
smoking; ii) workplace protection; iii) the protection of non-smokers in general; iv) tobacco and 
product specifications, including tar, nicotine, and associated ISO (International Standards 
Organization) measurement methods; v) labelling, promotion, sponsorship, publicity; and vi) 
environment and sensitive spaces). The instruments raise a legitimate question as to the necessity of 
using litigation as a gap-filling technique to supplement regulatory policy) or whether other similar 
justifications exist to support the efficiency of litigation in this sphere. W. Kip Viscusi, Regulation of 
Health, Safety and Environmental Risks 3-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.  
11934, 2006).  
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brought, and the impact thereof on the current commercial, economic, and regulatory 
modus vivendi can aid policymakers in assessing the implications of this regulatory 
dynamic. 
When considering the possible international implications of U.S. tobacco 
control, one needs to acknowledge the specific conditions of the legal system of the 
home country. The United States has a unique approach to litigation, particularly as it 
relates to mass torts and product liability claims. The courts have been propelled to 
the center of the debate, with litigants seeking to vindicate their rights before judges 
vested with great discretion over the scope and progress of the proceedings and lay 
juries capable of meting out substantial monetary awards. This primacy of the judicial 
system in arbitrating among the various societal stakeholders might or might not be 
consistent with systems that have adopted a more regulatory and administrative 
approach to managing issues of broad societal significance, such as those in Europe, 
and to some extent Asia. 58  
V.   International Implications of the U.S. Experience 
A.  History of the International Experience 
A detailed analysis of the international experience is beyond the scope of this 
article,59 but a few analytical and strategic points can be made. As tobacco litigation 
reached its second wave in the United States with the Cipollone case of 1988 and the 
use of extensive document production, it was just beginning internationally. The first 
case was filed in Australia in 1986 and then in Europe in 1988. The Aho litigation in 
                                                
58 W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts 36 (Harvard Law School 
Discussion Paper No.  291, 2000), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1079&context=harvard/olin (“The results in this article highlight the fact that there is a serious problem 
in the way the courts address matters pertaining to health, safety, and environmental risks.”). 
59 See ASPECT CONSORTIUM, TOBACCO OR HEALTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/Tobacco/ 
Documents/tobacco_fr_en.pdf (on the European tobacco scenario). 
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Finland60  involved an individual smoker and incorporated a number of the standard 
allegations. Since then, diverse forms of litigation have proliferated internationally. 
Individual cases, class actions, recoupment cases, and, most recently, “lights” cases, 
have all been filed in Israel, while Spain and France have seen both individual cases 
and recoupment actions.  
The absence of contingent fee arrangements, the generally lower amount of 
damages awards61 (Israel constitutes an exception),62 the limited existence of class 
action statutes, and the existence of a professional judiciary as opposed to a jury 
system, have all served to contain the scope and magnitude of tobacco litigation 
outside the United States. Developments are not static however. Class action 
proposals have been formally adopted in Sweden and proposed in both Finland and 
France. “Lights” litigation is developing in Italy, alleging the deceptive nature of the 
term “lights” prior to the prohibition of its use on cigarette packaging as mandated by 
the EU Directive 2001/37/EC. 
 As with the experience in the United States prior to the MSA, the industry 
continues to successfully defend these cases from both a procedural and substantive 
perspective. For the same type of cases brought to court in Europe as decades earlier 
in the United States, firms were able to use their U.S. court experience in a similar 
and successful manner. The critical issue going forward will be the extent to which 
the U.S. experience should be replicated before a realistic modus vivendi can be 
                                                
60 This is the case between Pentti Aho and the companies Oy Rettig Ab and Suomen Tupakka – British 
American Tobacco Nordic which the Finnish Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the case in 2001 
after years of wrangling. 
61 The first victory against the tobacco companies in Italy was the Stalteri case, in which the court 
awarded plaintiff 200,000 Euros. Italian high court rules for smoker’s wife, UNITED PRESS 
INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Top_News/2007/11/06/ 
italian_high_court_rules_for_smokers_wife/1194/. 
62 Damages claimed in Israeli cases filed since 1998, involving medical cost recoupment or “lights” 
issues have sought recoveries equivalent to several billion U.S. dollars. Litigation Outside the U.S. 
(2000), available at http://www.facworld.com/FacWorld.nsf/doc/TobaccLitROW/$file/ROWtoblitig. 
pdf. 
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reached. That is, after a period of individual cases, and class actions afterwards, 
should we expect a third wave in Europe, with national health services, sickness funds 
or large health plans seeking medical cost recoupment? 
 Much is made of industry attempts to penetrate the markets of the developing 
world in order to expand markets and secure market share. In pursuing these 
objectives, the tobacco industry is increasingly sensitive to both the public relations 
and real costs of the U.S. experience just as companies in other industry sectors, such 
as Microsoft, have factored their U.S. experience into their approach abroad. 
Therefore, if faced with litigation against politically backed agents, at the light of U.S. 
experience, one may expect firms will actually look for some sort of settlement. If this 
perception has some element of truth and it becomes perceived by national health 
services and sickness funds, such legal actions may become self-fulfilling prophecies. 
B.  Systemic Considerations 
As nations outside the United States evaluate the best manner of addressing 
the “tobacco” issue from a public health and societal perspective,63 they should take 
the existing systemic balance into consideration.  
As has been outlined above, the United States is uniquely hospitable to 
litigation. Given the relative aversion to centralized, regulatory solutions, litigation is 
seen as a valid and important means of arbitrating among diverse and often divergent 
societal interests. Accordingly, mass tort litigation and the procedural devices 
necessary to prosecute it (i.e., document discovery, class actions, and contingent fees) 
have developed into pillars of the system. Within this matrix, the judge is vested with 
great discretion to ensure that such devices are used in a consistent manner.  Such 
                                                
63 Hiilamo, supra note 6 (“The Finnish experience was that litigation does not stand alone as a mean to 
achieve public health policy goals. Litigation complements a broader approach to tobacco control 
policymaking by stimulating national debate over the role of smoking in society. Thereby it may well 
move the policy agenda. … [After all]… despite its legal loss, the litigation contributed to subsequent 
tobacco control legislation in Finland”.).  
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control over the process can be far-reaching, casting the judge in the role of 
gatekeeper. For instance, it is the judge who decides whether the requirements for 
class certification in mass tort cases claiming monetary damages have been met. This 
is a wide grant of authority but one consistent with a system in which litigation has 
gained currency as a recognized means for vindicating collective rights.  
The primacy of litigation in the U.S. system as a substitute for, or supplement 
to, regulation may also explain the melding of the two as reflected in the MSA. 
Within the U.S. system, litigation can assume a “gap-filling” role,64 the contours of 
which can vary depending on the industry at issue. The recognition of the growing 
encroachment of litigation on the regulatory field resulted in the passage in February 
2005 of the Class Action Fairness Act, a law designed to channel class actions to the 
federal courts where certification can be more difficult to secure than in the parallel 
state system. 
 In contrast to the U.S. system, which is often described as case-specific and 
litigation-driven, continental legal systems and those derived therefrom tend to be 
more regulatory and administrative in nature.65 With regard to tobacco control 
policies, this is reflected in consistently high levels of excise taxes66 and the use of 
advertising bans in countries, such as Norway, Finland, and Sweden dating back to 
the 1960s. More recent bans have been introduced in Ireland, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal. Issues of broad societal significance are shifted to the regulatory sphere with 
litigation being left to address individualized disputes. 
 Within this matrix, code-based legal systems establish the judge as the agent 
of the legislature. His or her role is to apply the code without recourse to discretion or 
                                                
64 This gap-filling role is related to “a piece-meal approach” towards codification. In Europe, due to a 
more extensive use of regulation, there is less room for this role of litigation. Regulation makes also 
even more difficult to find strong legal as well as economic basis for such litigation.  
65 Reimann, supra note 19,  at 810 n.305. 
66 Cutler & Glaeser, supra note 53. Both regulatory instruments and excise taxes are higher in Europe. 
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to do so using far less discretion than that exercised by U.S. counterparts. The 
question then arises as to whether a more expansive and hospitable framework for 
litigation, including class action legislation, would be consistent with the existing 
institutional balance. Importation of specific procedural tools on a piecemeal basis 
may upset settled societal compromises concerning the role of regulation and 
litigation without offering a suitable, predictable alternative.67  
This is not to say that legal systems should not evolve to address increasing 
industrial complexity, only that such considerations must be made in context. In the 
same manner that the United States has trimmed back access to the courts through the 
Class Action Fairness Act, expanded access to the courts in jurisdictions outside the 
United States may be in order. Indeed, we may be witnessing a convergence, with the 
United States seeking to limit access to courts and jurisdictions outside the United 
States seeking to expand access. Such decisions have distinct implications for 
maintaining the balance between regulation and litigation, harmonizing disparate 
economic interests, and maintaining predictability within the system. 
 Such theoretical considerations will play out against the class action statute 
recently promulgated in Sweden, the current proposals in France, and the broader 
discussions concerning the efficacy of enacting an EU-wide class action statute.68 
These developments will have significant implications for the ebb and flow of 
litigation both nationally and internationally and will stimulate a re-evaluation of 
concerning the appropriate role of the legal system in addressing social policy issues. 
                                                
67 Reimann, supra note 19 (for the main characteristics of U.S. and European legal traditions); see also 
RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, MIRANT R. DAMASKA & PETER E. HERZOG, 
COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT & MATERIALS (5th ed. 1988) (for a classical in-depth analysis); 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE BASICS 
(2005) (for a U.S. legal tradition-focused perspective). 
68COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER: LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS 
(1999), available at http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com1999-396_en.pdf 
(discussing  further access to justice through class and group actions); see Faulk, supra note 17, at 235 
(presenting the differences between class and group actions, sustaining that the latter may be a better 
option in the European context, at least until the overcoming of class action abuses). 
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Starting from different endpoints in the spectrum, litigation versus direct 
regulation as means to adjust norms to society’s values, the two approaches seem to 
be converging in their outcome.  
C. Tobacco Control Policy and Litigation         
  In light of the differences between the legal system in the United States and 
elsewhere and, conversely, the proposals relating to class actions that may promote a 
convergence, the question arises as to how tobacco control measures can be best 
managed and implemented. The U.S. experience suggests that a strategy of 
accommodation, where legitimate economic and societal interests can be recognized 
and balanced is the path dictated by increasing globalization, instantaneous 
communications, and the growing power of consumer groups. Will the rough 
accommodation taking hold in the United State be achieved internationally without 
passing through similar phases of litigation and the attendant (mis)allocation of 
resources?69  
A parallel concern is whether the current arrangements and identifiable trends 
in the United States constitute the contours of an emerging “equilibrium” in the 
relations among government, society, and industry or merely a lull in litigation 
activity. Soaring health care costs will continue to exert pressure on health care 
systems and spur government efforts toward cost containment. In addition, changing 
consumption patterns in the population may lead companies to adopt different 
business strategies that may or may not collide with government priorities and related 
approaches to corporate governance and social policy priorities. Such an analysis, 
particularly as it relates to future scenarios and the attainment of a stable equilibrium, 
                                                
69 Cutler & Glaeser, supra note 53 (confirming despite greater regulation and higher cigarette tax rates, 
the smoking level in the European Union is much higher than in the U.S.). This suggests that litigation 
may have been useful not only to raise awareness of smoking harms but also to propel a “cultural 
change” in the U.S.. Effectiveness is of course not the same as efficiency.  
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is predicated on viewing tobacco as a product that will continue to exist irrespective 
of regulatory policy due to underlying demand. If one accepts this proposition 
together with the view that notions of corporate governance and behavior have 
evolved,70 then the focus should be on achieving the new modus vivendi without 
imposing dead weight costs on society. A balance of power must exist before a 
meaningful compact can be reached. In this regard, Article 19 of the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control sets a useful benchmark:71 
Article 19 - Liability 
1.   For the purpose of tobacco control, the Parties shall consider taking 
legislative action or promoting their existing laws, where 
necessary, to deal with criminal and, civil liability, including 
compensation where appropriate. 
2.  Parties shall cooperate with each other in exchanging information 
through the Conference of the Parties in accordance with Article 21 
including: 
(a) information on the health effects of the consumption of tobacco 
products and exposure to tobacco smoke in accordance with 
Article 20.3(a); and  
(b) information on legislation and regulations in force as well as 
pertinent jurisprudence. 
3.  The Parties shall, as appropriate and mutually agreed, within the 
limits of national legislation, policies, legal practices and 
                                                
70 A brief look at the websites of the largest tobacco companies shows the industry’s intention to 
cooperate with governments, to help and take part in regulatory instruments, and to disclose recent 
research and other relevant materials.  
71 WHO Framework on Tobacco Control, supra note 55; Lawrence O. Gostin, World Health Law: 
Toward a New Conception of Global Health Governance for the 21st Century, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y 
L. & ETHICS 413 (2005) (discussing whether there is a movement towards a “tobacco” vertical 
governance, enabling tobacco regulatory standards to be harmonized). 
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applicable existing treaty arrangements, afford one another 
assistance in legal proceedings relating to civil and criminal 
liability consistent with this Convention. 
4.  The Convention shall in no way affect or limit any rights of access 
of the parties to each other’s courts where such rights exist. 
5.  The Conference of the Parties may consider, if possible, at an early 
stage, taking account of the work being done in relevant 
international fora, issues related to liability including appropriate 
international approaches to these issues and appropriate means to 
support, upon request, the Parties in their legislative and other 
activities in accordance with this Article.  
The Convention manifests a broad societal concern, together with a firm intent 
on the part of governments, to control tobacco, using all appropriate legal means at a 
country’s disposal. Interestingly, the industry participated in the elaboration of the 
Convention, exercising its option regarding notice and comment. At the time its 
contributions were viewed with skepticism due to the atmosphere of abiding mistrust 
arising from decades of adversarial relations. The approach to these issues can be 
either dictatorial or consensual, with the adoption of the latter relying on a paradigm 
shift between the industry and its regulators. 
Given the evolution of the litigation environment in the United States, 
including the evolving consensus concerning the industry’s right to exist within 
certain confines and prevailing views of corporate responsibility, the approach to 
tobacco control on the international level should focus on finding the appropriate 
space in which to reach an accommodation, provided that both sides have sufficient 
economic incentives to do so.  
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This will require the industry to find an adequate interlocutor and the parties to 
agree on certain basic principles regarding the role of the product in society, including 
its immediate externalities, the underlying demand for the product, and the 
impossibility of immediately reallocating productive capacity to other uses while 
maintaining employment and budgetary flexibility.  
At the international level, there will be questions as to whether “one size fits 
all” with regard to the appropriate scope and content of a given accommodation. The 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the move toward harmonization 
regarding both product liability and product safety issues, and the notoriety of the 
tobacco control issue may render some type of concerted action possible. The 
European approach, which tends to favor regulation and administration over litigation 
and case-specific outcomes, may further provide an impetus toward a negotiated 
solution, whether it takes the form of an international or EU-wide settlement or a set 
of national settlements concluded pursuant to certain broad international guidelines. 
We believe governments will move assertively to contain the negative effects 
of smoking by adopting forceful public health strategies. Our analysis, however, 
suggests that such steps should be informed on the international level by the litigation 
experience in the United States. In an era of heightened, highly public standards of 
corporate responsibility, when consensus can be promoted by commercial 
compromise, judicial moderation, and transparent regulatory action adapted to 
prevailing institutional conditions, such an approach provides an opportunity to move 
expeditiously to a realistic equilibrium at lower cost. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
Tobacco litigation took root in the fertile ground of the U.S. legal system, with 
individual claims against the companies being used as an ad hoc tool for elaborating 
social policy. The social norms and public health concerns at the time were, however, 
permissive regarding smoking. Evidence about health and the health cost impact of 
smoking has only been gathered over time due to increasing societal awareness and 
parallel strides in scientific and medical knowledge.  
The repeated success of the tobacco companies in individual cases lead to a 
new legal approach focusing on class actions. As before, the focus was on the alleged 
misconduct of the tobacco companies, as buttressed by the production of 
documentation through the use of the aforementioned “discovery” procedure. 
Tobacco litigation then began to spread internationally, with individual cases 
appearing in several countries. Thus, with a lag of almost thirty years, other countries 
followed the United States, albeit on a much smaller and restrained scale, with again a 
substantial advantage for the tobacco companies in terms of litigation success rates. 
The standard of proof required to demonstrate the misconduct of the tobacco 
companies is hard to meet, as it must distinguish between the individual decisions of 
consumers regarding smoking, given the associated and increasingly well-known 
health risks, and those perhaps unfairly induced or “promoted” by the companies due 
to industry misconduct.  
As has been seen, a third wave began in the U.S. in the  1990s, based on four 
distinctive features: (i) reliance on politically powerful third party payors in the form 
of the states or state- supported health care entities to bring the cases (ii) increased 
knowledge of smoking and its health implications and related industry (mis)conduct 
acquired through the enhanced access to documentation during the second wave, (iii) 
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increasing medical costs on a system-wide basis, and (iv) an alleged causal 
relationship between smoking and health care costs. The evidence produced matched 
an interest on the part of the U.S. states to recoup medical treatment costs associated 
with tobacco consumption. 
The move to focus on aspects more amenable to measurement (e.g., the health 
implications and quantified costs of smoking), the sheer size of the claims involved, 
and the political power of the plaintiffs changed the risks of litigation for the 
companies, despite their previous record of courtroom success. This modified 
litigation landscape and changed risk calculus prompted the search for an agreement 
that essentially had the nature of an “insurance contract” – against a stream of  
payments effected over a period of 25 years, no more legal cases of a similar nature 
would be brought by the states. Basically, the cost of prior litigation and the 
possibility of even more costly future litigation lead the parties to establish a sort of 
regulatory compact for the tobacco industry derived  directly from the litigation 
process. 
For the international scene, one may wonder whether the same route and a 
similar endpoint will be reached. In our view, the development of a formal and 
increasingly strict regulatory equilibrium will emerge, without recourse to the 
intensive litigation that characterized the U.S. process.  
This is due to two main reasons: (1) Tobacco companies are globalized and 
their resulting openness to a transparent, consensual regulatory modus vivendi is 
therefore likely to develop in overseas jurisdictions faster than was the case in the 
United States. Indeed, the public smoking bans implemented across Europe without 
the intensive lobbying efforts to counter such measures that had characterized 
industry strategy and conduct in the past are an indication of the new ethos; and (2) 
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The legal traditions and systemic frameworks of many jurisdictions outside the U.S. 
are not heavily reliant on case-specific decisions for effecting social change but rather 
on the elaboration and implementation of regulatory, administrative, and legislative 
norms. Moreover, the difficulties in proving in an adjudicative forum the alleged 
misconduct of the tobacco companies and the effect thereof on consumer behavior 
discourage the use of the courts. Such difficulties are further compounded by the 
general lack, or at least limited availability in non-US jurisdictions, of procedural 
devices, such as the aforementioned “discovery” technique for gaining access to and 
assembling company information. Lower damages amounts in most non-U.S. 
jurisdictions provide a further disincentive for resorting to full-blown, “scorched-
earth” litigation. 
For all of the above reasons, stemming from the history of the extensive 
litigation in the U.S. and the related legal and economic lessons learned, to the 
globalized nature of the product and resulting societal perceptions, to the regulatory 
emphasis in most jurisdictions outside the U.S., and the common interest of 
government regulators and companies in managing the product in a socially efficient 
and potentially “Pareto-optimal” manner, it appears that the U.S. litigation experience 
is unlikely to be replicated abroad. Moreover, it is likely that the consensual, 
somewhat less confrontational, approach is likely to be a harbinger of the future on 
both sides of the Atlantic, particularly where issues of broad social policy are at stake, 
whether in the tobacco sector or in other industries of social concern. 
  To conclude, it is worth returning to our initial questions: How can the U.S. 
experience in tobacco litigation serve as a guide at the international level? And has it 
served the broader public interest? 
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In the United States, litigation was deemed to be an important supplement to 
an already highly regulated tobacco sector, regardless of the attendant costs. The 
tradition of private attorneys general, whereby individuals are expected, if not 
encouraged, to vindicate their rights through litigation, provided a favorable backdrop 
for the proliferation of court cases in the U.S. context.  
European countries start from a different point, with a highly developed 
regulatory culture, different legal traditions, and less overall reliance on litigation to 
address issues of broad social policy. It is therefore difficult to see how the same road 
can be followed, and in light of what appears to be the endpoint, whether, indeed, it 
should be.  
In the United States, the final balance has now been broadly defined at both 
the state and federal level with the conclusion of the MSA, and the recently decided 
federal racketeering (RICO) case, with individual litigation being relegated to a 
smaller and declining role. The rough equilibrium to which the United States has 
gravitated over the years appears to be already well advanced in Europe through the 
direct regulatory path. Rapidly industrializing and developing economies in Asia and 
elsewhere also appear to be moving expeditiously to plug regulatory gaps through the 
passage of tobacco control legislation inspired by both the European model and 
international instruments, such as the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, even as sporadic litigation activity has manifested itself.  
Thus, the final outcome reached in the United States is likely to be also 
reached internationally, most likely by a heavy reliance on direct, transparent 
regulation, thereby saving the time and costs of the litigation path. 
On the second question regarding the public interest, it is clear that the 
tobacco cases raised the awareness of citizens in the U.S. concerning the health risks, 
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though the extent of the ‘market failure’ concerning (a) the ability of consumers to 
assess accurately the relevant risk and (b) the related efficiency of using litigation to 
remedy this alleged information gap, particularly in terms of cost and transparency are 
suspect. Ultimately, firms changed their behavior in order to find a new ‘business 
space’ adapted to prevailing social perceptions and circumstances that would allow 
them to function as legitimate commercial actors without having to engage in 
constant, high cost litigation. Government responded to secure enhanced enforcement 
and control over the product together with a predictable revenue stream derived 
therefrom. Globalization and enhanced communication will no doubt promote similar 
cooperation strategies on the part of the industry and governments elsewhere. Having 
experienced a somewhat coerced change from old business ways to the ones available 
under (and compatible with) the MSA in the United States, firms are likely to move 
rapidly in a conciliatory direction. 
From the European and perhaps the broader international perspective, it would 
therefore appear that moving to a sustainable commercial and societal equilibrium 
through transparent regulation and openly negotiated compromises, as opposed to 
litigation, might offer the lowest cost and most efficient alternative for both 
safeguarding the public interest, as defined at the outset of this article, and managing 
what most agree is a controversial, but well-ensconced, product sector. 
For many, the tobacco industry is anachronistic, at best, and wholly 
unacceptable, at worst. Oscillating between these two poles, the tobacco industry may 
actually become a template for other industries in the development of consensual 
rulemaking practices designed to enhance government control, enforcement, and 
revenues while providing the commercial stakeholders room to carry out their 
business. Given the growing complexity of the world economy and the development 
 41 
of new industries and companies of ever increasing global reach, it appears likely 
that some form of direct regulatory approach, balancing the interests of the concerned 
stakeholders, will become common place to secure the efficiencies that are lost in 
piecemeal litigation. Microsoft's attempt to accommodate the European Union in the 
antitrust sphere, albeit after a protracted legal battle, is, in some respects, a variation 
on the tobacco theme outlined in this paper. It is easy to imagine that 
such an approach predicated on direct discussions aimed at accommodating the 
interests of the concerned stakeholders will become the norm as the implications of 
certain forms of commercial activity for areas of broad, yet pressing, social concern, 
such as the environment or privacy, become evident. The matrix of government, 
individual, and commercial interests at issue will require a more global, synthetic, and 
collaborative approach to regulation in order to ensure both reasonable and 
appropriate control for government and sufficient commercial freedom and initiative 
for industry to promote movement toward an appropriate and sustainable societal 
equilibrium. 
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